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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is little disagreement today among Americans that the current system of 
elementary and secondary public education in the United States is in need of significant 
improvement.  Indeed, recent results of standardized tests have placed American 12th 
graders near the bottom among students from 21 countries in the areas of mathematics 
and science.1 In his most recent State of the Union Address, President Clinton reaffirmed 
his previous statements that the improvement of public schools should be “[Americans’] 
highest priority.” 2 Recently, the Clinton Administration has proposed measures such as 
hiring an additional 100,000 teachers to reduce overall class sizes as well as increasing 
federal spending to provide greatly needed repairs to many of America’s schools.   It is 
clear that improving the quality of public education in America has become a very 
important political issue.   However, despite the general consensus that America’s public 
schools are not performing well, there is a profound and fervent debate now taking place 
on precisely what should be done to improve the present state of public education in the 
United States.  
The purpose of this paper is to address the complex issue of public school reform. 
I will focus primarily on the rather generic concept of school choice, which will 
inevitably be defined and redefined, throughout my analysis.  In doing this, I will first 
examine the structure and composition of the market for education in America.  I will 
then briefly look at some theoretical approaches to educational reform.  Lastly, I will 
examine specific reform proposals that draw on some of the many varying concepts of 
choice as well as currently enacted projects that have a form of choice as 
their focus.  My analysis will focus on the likely effects of these proposals on the main 
actors in the educational system- students, teachers, and government bureaucrats.      
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II. THE MARKET FOR EDUCATION  
 
 An effective discussion of education reform simply cannot take place unless the 
parties involved have an understanding of the current educational marketplace in the 
United States.  As is the case of other markets in the “real” world, it becomes clear that 
imperfections exist within the market for education.  One arises simply from the fact that 
public schools are not at all integrated in a truly competitive system.  In many isolated, 
rural areas, a single public school is the only feasible educational choice offered to 
parents and students.  Thus, public schools in these areas are able to exercise monopoly 
power over their customers, the purchasers of education.   In many urban areas, public 
schools are interspersed along with private schools.  However, because of the high cost of 
many private schools, public schools are still able to exert monopoly power over families 
who cannot afford these educational alternatives.  Through these two basic examples of 
inefficient irritants in America’s public school system, one begins to realize that there are 
inherent problems in the form and structure of education in America.  The remainder of 
this section will draw on more specific scholarly analyses and critiques of these 
problems.   
Perhaps the best way to understand the current educational system in the U.S. is to 
examine the areas in which market imperfections are curtailing socially optimal  
outcomes. In his two widely read books, Capitalism and Freedom and Free to Choose,3 
Milton Friedman attempts to do precisely this. As one of the most outspoken critics of the 
current educational system in the U.S., Friedman offers in his works an intuitive 
economic analysis of educational problems in America.  With no apologies, Friedman 
examines the educational system from a perspective greatly biased toward a free-market 
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ideal.  While this approach is indeed one-sided, an economic evaluation of the 
educational system would be incomplete without investigating this view.   
Before the mid-1800s, America’s schools were primarily locally-centered, private 
institutions.  Friedman argues that this system was replaced by the current system of 
centralized public education not because of choices made by parents but rather because of 
pressure from self-interested teachers and administrators, and also because of arguments 
made by well-meaning intellectuals (1979, 154).  This, according to Friedman, resulted in 
the evolution of a highly bureaucratic educational system.  This centralization, he argues, 
has caused “a reduction in the ability of consumers to choose, and an increase in the 
power of producers” (1979, 157).  In this analysis Friedman alludes to one of the main 
characteristics of the market for public schools.  In effect, while students’ and parents’ 
logical objectives are to maximize overall student performance and utility as well as the 
performance of schools as a whole, teachers and administrators may be motivated by 
other self-serving objectives.  If public schools have some degree of monopoly and if the 
operators of schools can be assured of state and federal aid without much accountability, 
then these self-serving objectives are more likely to win over the less influential 
objectives of students and their families (1979, 172). 
 Friedman also discusses the consequences of income differences among 
consumers of education given the current system of public and private schooling.  He 
asserts that wealthy families have greater educational opportunities today than poor 
families because the affluent can afford the double-payments involved in sending a child 
to a private school. In effect, families with children enrolled in private schools must first 
pay the government the amount required for financing their “share” of public schooling 
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and they must also pay private school tuition (1962, 93).  Also, the wealthy can more 
easily relocate to neighborhoods in which public schools are of better quality.  This 
inevitably results in segregation within public schools, which is based directly on 
families’ income.  Those who cannot afford to move to districts in which schools are of 
acceptable quality are left together in an abyss of poor quality education.  To make 
matters worse, Friedman argues that there is also inequality in the marginal educational 
value of money spent in wealthy as opposed to poor school districts.  In poorer districts, 
which are more likely to have higher crime rates, more money must be spent on non-
educational costs such as security and less on actually educating students (1978, 158). 
 Importantly, Friedman’s analysis provides the argument that a correctly 
functioning, competitive market will allow for an adequate exchange of information 
between the parties involved in the various transactions.  In effect, as one moves farther 
away from a model of perfect competition toward a system with more characteristics of 
oligopoly or monopoly, it becomes more difficult for preferences to be reveled through 
normal market functions.  Charles Manski (1992) of the Institute for Research on Poverty 
at the University of Wisconsin summarizes the factors leading to inadequate information 
exchange in the education market as well as forces affecting the supply (the structure and 
type) of education provided:   
The theoretical argument for choice, as stated by Milton Friedman and as 
espoused today, is a straightforward application of elementary principles 
of classical economics: Tax support of public schools distorts the 
incentives faced by both the consumers and producers of schooling.  
Consumers incentives are distorted because the residents of a given school 
district are encouraged to enroll their children in that district’s public 
schools rather than in private schools or out-of-district public schools, 
where they may have to pay fees of several thousand dollars per year.  
Producer incentives are distorted because the price differential between a 
district’s public schools and other educational alternatives gives the public 
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schools local monopoly power over district residents; hence the public 
schools can attract students even if they do not provide the type and 
quality of education that families want.4 
  
Given a system in which it is difficult for parents to place their children in schools of 
their choosing, consumers of education are unable to adequately reveal their preferences 
through market mechanisms. A system in which these distortions do not exist would 
allow dissatisfied parents to convey their wishes by choosing not to enroll their children 
in these schools.  Hence distortions in demand are inherent in America’s present 
educational system. 
 Manski also refers to supply distortions within the same system.  Given that 
public schools are controlled by local, state, and federal government and that teachers’ 
objectives are voiced primarily through teachers unions, the quality of education is 
inevitably influenced by third parties.  Schools are also required by law to meet certain 
government criteria.  These criteria include sometimes rigid curriculum controls as well 
as requiring teachers to be licensed.   
Private schools, operating more within a competitive marketplace, have far fewer 
controls and restrictions placed upon them.  This, in turn, has caused the structures of the 
two systems of education to greatly diverge from one another.  Many proponents of 
private school educational methods believe that it is precisely this freedom from 
governmental controls and restrictions that allow private schools to successfully compete 
in a system in which the barriers to consumers in purchasing private education are 
significantly higher than those for purchasers of public education.  Manski states, “a 
series of studies comparing public and private schools…have interpreted available 
achievement data as showing that private schools, especially Catholic ones, do a better 
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job of educating their students than do public schools” (1992, 8).  If private schools are 
indeed outperforming public schools, one must ultimately ask if the differences in 
supply-side factors such as the looser regulation of private schools are not at least part of 
the cause.   
Yet, few people would argue that removing all educational regulations in public 
schools would be an acceptable (or politically feasible) policy to implement.  Few would 
also argue that teachers unions could (or should) be eliminated.  However, when 
assessing the educational marketplace, one must realize that the existence of these factors 
tends to move the educational system toward a more monopolistic structure.  James 
Fallows5 (1989) writes that “licensing essentially [gives] small groups the right to 
regulate their own competition” (135).  The end result of licensing is to raise the barriers 
to enter the licensed workforce and thus to raise the returns to those who are fortunate 
enough to be licensed.  Thus, Fallows argues that it is in teachers unions’ best interest to 
“…fight hard to keep ‘unqualified’ people, those without education degrees, out of their 
profession, and then fight equally hard against competence tests and outside assessments 
of how qualified teachers are” (163).  Consequently, forces in the demand and supply 
sides of the education market tend to distort and reduce the offerings of schools to 
students and their families.   
 Upon inspection of the market for education in the United States, it becomes clear 
that many powerful forces are reducing the power of consumers and increasing the power 
of the producers of public education.  These forces affect both the supply and demand 
sides of the educational marketplace.  Based on the above analysis, one may infer that the 
major structural problems facing America’s educational system today result from the 
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relatively high degree of monopoly power that public schools in the U.S. are able to 
wield over students and their families who are the ultimate purchasers of education.  
Increased competition among schools intuitively appears to be at least a partial solution 
to these problems.  Thus, an analysis of the effects of increased competition on the 
education market becomes necessary. 
III. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF INCREASED COMPETITION 
ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
This section will briefly discuss the theoretical effects of increased competition on 
public schools as well as on the overall market for education.  It will analyze some 
empirical findings based on works by economist Caroline Minter Hoxby (1994) of 
Harvard University.  The section will approach the question of the effects of increased 
competition from two perspectives.  The first will focus on the effects of increasing the 
level of competition solely among public schools themselves. The second will then factor 
private schools into the equation, and discuss the implications of competition between 
these two distinctly different educational entities. 6 
 Hoxby’s paper on competition between public schools predicts increased sorting 
of students among schools, higher productivity (better student performance per input), 
and decreased incentives to send children to private schools as the primary intuitive 
effects of increasing competition among schools.  The increased competition, she argues, 
would result if students and parents were given greater degrees of choice in their 
schooling.7 Her measure of student performance is based on educational attainment, 
wages, and Armed Forces Qualifications Test scores.  All effects are assumed to take 
place in the long-term, as a result of expecting slow adjustments to changes both in the 
bureaucratic public sector as well as by parents and students themselves.   
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 In general terms, Hoxby finds that increased competition among public schools 
does lead to greater student productivity.  She finds that students’ performance improves 
as seen by increased educational attainment, higher post-schooling wages, and higher test 
scores overall.  These improvements occur in the poorest as well as the wealthiest school 
districts.  Hoxby finds evidence of increased sorting (i.e. some students leaving schools 
for other educational opportunities) but she does not find this to be harmful to 
disadvantaged groups.   
 Hoxby’s study also analyzes “real” statistical changes resulting from greater 
competition.  Specifically, she studies the effects of increases in competition among 
public schools generated by changing the composition of a metropolitan school district 
from two equal-sized to ten equal-sized school districts.  This change, she says, results in 
a decrease in per-pupil spending of $219, an improvement in educational attainment of .3 
years, and an increase in post-schooling wages of 5%.  The effect on private schools is, in 
fact, inverse as is predicted in Hoxby’s thesis.  Consequently, the structural changes in 
the public school district results in a decrease in private school enrollment of 2%.  In 
effect, Hoxby finds that increasing competition among public schools results in lower 
per-student costs and better overall student performance.   
In her analysis of the competitive effect of private schools on public schools, 
Hoxby focuses on religiously affiliated schools because these make up over 87% of the 
total private school enrollment.  Hoxby theorizes that increasing competition between 
private and public schools will result in greater spreading of information about schools’ 
productivity.  This should result, she argues, because a situation in which public schools 
are forced to compete directly would result in total public school budgets depending 
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positively on productivity.  If a public school is not productive, less education will be 
demanded from it and more money will be spent on private rather than public schools.  
Thus, normal market mechanisms would express consumers’ preferences.   
Hoxby also empirically analyzes the effects of competition form private schools 
on educational attainment and test scores.  She finds that a 10% increase in the private 
school enrollment share results in .9 years of additional educational attainment, and a 7% 
increase in students’ test scores.  Most importantly, She finds that “for an equal 
movement of students, competition from private schools has approximately double the 
positive effect on public school students that competition between public schools has” 
(1994, 26).   
 The studies done by Caroline Minter Hoxby strongly suggest that increasing the 
degree of competition facing public schools will result in greater student output per unit 
of input.  Given that competition will increase the effectiveness of public schools, the 
important debate then revolves around precisely how competition would best be 
introduced to the current system of public schooling in America.  The last section of this 
paper evaluates some of the most popular proposals and current projects of educational 
reform within the United States.  These evaluations are based on the previous analyses of 
the education market and the effects of increased competition on public schools. 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS AND CURRENT REFORM PROJECTS 
  
Most of the current proposals of educational reform as well as projects taking 
place in cities throughout America are based on the idea of choice.  School choice has 
come to mean very different things to different groups and individuals.  However, choice 
in general has come to mean decreasing the level of distortions in the supply and demand 
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side of the educational market by reducing, to some degree, the monopoly power held by 
the public school system in America.  This section will discuss the effects of Friedman’s 
proposed voucher system, drawing conclusions from the voucher experiment currently 
taking place in Milwaukee as well as on data based on an economic model developed by 
Manski.  It will also discuss examples of school choice currently taking place in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Brooklyn, New York.  Lastly, it will briefly discuss the 
relatively recently popularized idea of charter schools, which appear to be gaining 
tremendous momentum in the United States.   
 Friedman’s proposal of educational vouchers for students who enroll in private 
schools is by far one of the most drastic educational reform proposals, as well as one of 
the most hotly debated.  His proposal calls for a voucher, to be valued at the cost of 
educating a student in the public system, to be given directly to parents for use in 
providing their child with whichever educational opportunities they wish. This particular 
system of choice, according to Friedman, would result in the removal of distortions in the 
educational market.  He argues that because parents could freely choose where to send 
their children, information would be adequately transmitted, and consumer preferences 
would be better revealed.  Moreover, the voucher would greatly increase competition 
among schools thus increasing overall productivity and producing higher returns to 
educational investment.  Friedman goes so far as to suggest that the freeing up of such 
large sums of capital to be specifically invested in education would inevitably result in a 
dramatic change in the structure of schools throughout the U.S.  In effect, schools that 
could no longer compete would exit the market and new and improved schools, offering a 
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new and improved “product” would replace them.  Schools would be forced to model 
themselves after consumers’ rather than producers’ wants.   
 In “Educational Choice and Social Mobility,” Charles Manski states that “Choice 
advocates can argue that a voucher system is inherently superior, on economic grounds, 
to public-school finance only if they presume that education approximately fits the 
assumptions of classical economics” (1992, 14).  Because of the difficulty in assessing 
this, Manski develops an empirical model of vouchers and attempts to derive the probable 
effects of vouchers through this model.  Manski’s cites two results as important in 
determining the value of educational vouchers.  First, the effects of vouchers on low-
income youth appear to be neither entirely positive nor negative.  In effect, vouchers help 
some poor students (i.e. those who leave the public schools) and hurt others (those who 
stay).  Second and most important, Manski finds that given even the most positive 
possible outcome in his model, educational vouchers simply do not come close to 
equalizing educational opportunities across income groups.  These findings are given 
further validity because his model was slightly biased toward vouchers.   
 I do not feel, however, that one can decide absolutely that Friedman’s idea of 
vouchers is inadequate solely based on Manski’s findings.  Many proponents of vouchers 
cite Milwaukee’s choice plan, which, since 1990, has provided 1000 children from low-
income families with vouchers to attend non-religious, private schools.8  This plan, 
according to Peterson and Noyes (1996), was severely weakened from Friedman's 
original concept because of severe limitations imposed by the state and local legislatures.  
However, they state that the program has developed into a definite success.  They note 
that “the number of students participating in the choice program more than doubled over 
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the first five years of the program.  The number of participating schools increased from 
seven to twelve, giving parents somewhat greater choice” (49).  Based on their analysis, 
it appears as though Milwaukee’s system of choice may indeed have benefits.   
However, it is important to note that many of the voucher system’s greatest 
opponents point to the Milwaukee experiment as evidence that Friedman’s voucher 
system is incredibly harmful.  One can see in the cartoon below that there is widely held 
skepticism that market mechanisms based on educational vouchers should have any place 
at all in determining the fate of public schools in America.9 
 
Given such skepticism, it appears as though educational vouchers have little 
political chance of being adopted in the way that Friedman has hoped for.  My analysis 
now turns to reform projects that have been enacted and are currently operating in several 
of America’s cities. 
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 John Chubb and Terry Moe (1990), 10 two highly influential advocates of choice 
programs, provide an overview of two current choice programs in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and East Brooklyn, New York: 
In Cambridge, which struggled through “white flight” from public to private 
schools throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, a program was developed in which 
neighborhood school district boundaries, per say, were eliminated.  Parents and students 
in Cambridge now select in order of preference up to four schools.  Along with these 
preferences, racial balance is taken into account, as is proximity in determining the 
schools in which children will be placed.  By far, they state, most students receive either 
their first or second choices.   
The results in Cambridge, according to Chubb and Moe, are that racial balance 
has been restored in the public school system in Cambridge.  Before the system was 
enacted, they argue, whites were “bailing out of the system into private schools and other 
districts” (210-211).  Competition among public schools has increased dramatically and 
the programs offered by public schools have diversified, effectively offering greater 
choice to students and parents.  Consequently, “by 1987, 89 percent of the district’s 
newly entering students (kindergarten aged) were choosing public schools, compared 
with 78 percent in 1979” (211).   
In 1973, district number four in East Harlem, New York ranked last in reading 
and mathematics among thirty-two school districts in New York City.  Beginning in 
1974, leaders there began to create alternative schools built around differing themes, 
philosophies, and areas of interest.  Some of the schools that arose were the Academy of 
Environmental Science, the Jose Feliciano Performing Arts School, the Isaac Newton 
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School for Math and Science, Rafael Cordero Bilingual School, the School of Science 
and Humanities, along with many others.  Due to economic constraints, many of the 
schools had to share buildings.  However, the schools were given relative freedom in 
admissions, programs, methods, and academic structure.  
The results of the Cambridge program can be seen most significantly in student 
performance.  “While only 15.9% of the district’s students were reading at or above grade 
level in 1973, 62.6% were doing so by 1987.  [District 4’s] scores now put it around the 
middle for New York City, rather than at the bottom” (214).   
The results sited by Chubb and Moe in the school choice systems in Cambridge 
and the East Bronx should greatly encourage advocates of school choice programs.  It 
appears as though the Cambridge and East Harlem systems have indeed been successful.  
One then logically asks ‘from where exactly does this success come?’  It appears as 
though, given the initial argument for increased competition among schools, that the 
higher levels of competition created by expanded choice in East Harlem and Cambridge 
are most likely responsible for greater student productivity.  In effect, increasing students 
‘and parents’ ability to choose between schools has reduced the demand distortions, and 
the supply distortions have been reduced by allowing schools to have greater choice as to 
their educational offerings.  
Perhaps as a result of these and other successes, charter schools- legally 
independent schools that operate using tax dollars- are becoming very popular among 
advocates of choice in America.11  Currently in Milwaukee, more than two dozen 
applications have been submitted to establish charter schools.  The mix of applicants 
includes newly proposed schools as well as existing private schools.  These schools wish 
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to remove many of the classical restraints that are placed on public schools (i.e. demand- 
and supply-side distortions).  One of the most controversial of these is the desire by 
administrators to be able to legally hire and fire employees without being required to 
negotiate with teachers unions or the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) administration.  
The argument behind this request is that schools and teachers will increase offerings to 
students if restraints that create and exploit public school monopoly power are removed.  
Producers, in effect, will be held more accountable for consumer satisfaction, and should 
consequently provide a better product. 
Also proposed in the Milwaukee charter plan is government funding by which 
each charter school would receive an amount of money (currently set at $6100) for each 
child who chooses to enroll.  Each additional child who chooses to enroll in a charter 
school would therefore cause a redistribution of resources from the traditional public 
school system to the charter school.  Clearly, this incorporates some of the ideas of 
Friedman’s proposed voucher system.  However, it does not appear at this time that 
parents would be able to add their own money to the public funding, and they would not 
receive a voucher directly.  Thus, this program appears to promote greater equality of 
educational opportunity for wealthy and poor students than Friedman’s original voucher 
proposal.   
Opponents to Milwaukee’s proposed charter system argue that MPS would be 
devastated by these competing schools.  They argue that MPS would perform worse with 
increased competition because the best students would be more likely to leave for charter 
schools leaving poor-performing students behind in a weakened public school system.  
Caroline Hoxby, as previously noted, does not find this to be the likely outcome.  
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However, it is difficult to envision a true Pareto improvement resulting from any drastic 
changes in the public education system including charter schools.  It is likely that some 
students and their families would suffer from deviation from the status quo.   
V. CONCLUSION: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE  
Given the relative unfeasibility of satisfying every party’s wants in public school 
reform, one must ask what the most socially optimal options are.  The diagnosis of public 
schools in America today appears both on intuitive as well as empirical grounds, to be an 
overall lack of competition and over-regulation.  The prescription for change must 
include both increasing competition as well as producer accountability and somewhat 
decreasing government regulation.  However, policymakers must be aware that incorrect 
amounts of this medicine could result in the ultimate demise of their patient.  Based on 
the observed results in East Harlem, it appears that charter schools may provide the 
correct dosage.  However, as shown in Cambridge, the schools must also remain sensitive 
to issues such as poverty and diversity.  It does not appear that Friedman’s free-market 
cure would provide the benefits to public schools that he envisioned without creating at 
least some serious redistribution problems.  However, any successful policy of extensive 
public school reform must include decreasing the monopoly power currently held by the 
producers of education.  
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